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Quality. It is based on secondary literature, own research and consultations with 
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following experts: Patt Westhoff (FAPRI), Josef Schmidhuber (FAO), Loek 
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1 World agricultural prices in a historical perspective 
 
World agricultural prices are very volatile which is due to traditional 
characteristics of agricultural markets such as inelastic (short run) supply and 
demand curves (see, Meijl et al. 2003).1 The volatility is also high because the 
world market is a relatively small residual market in a world distorted by 
agricultural policies.2 The combination of high technological change and inelastic 
demand cause real world prices to decline in the long run (trend). The prices, 
however, of many (major) agricultural commodities have risen quickly over 
recent years (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 Development of World Agricultural Prices, 1960–2007, 
USD/ton, in constant USD (1990) 
 
Source: World Bank data base (2008). 
 
 Recent increase in agricultural prices are strong, but even with the increase 
that we have observed in the last three years, real agricultural prices are still 
low compared to the peaks in prices of the mid970s. Local prices are linked with 
                                                 
1 “World food prices are instable and will remain unstable in the future. Forecast errors are large in 
predictions of world prices. There are always unexpected events in important drivers such as yields 
which are dependent on weather, plagues and diseases”. See, Meijl, H. van et al. (2003) Prijzen op 
agrarische wereldmarkten; Een verkenning van projecties. LEI, Rapport 8.03.06. 
2 Trade share (2006) in global production: rice (7%), cheese (7%), coarse grains (11%) and wheat 
(20%), FAO Statistics. 
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these world prices. The transmission effect depends on the transparency of 
markets, market power and accessibility. 
 
Figure 2 Index of Oil, Food and Industrial Commodities, 19924
2008, January 1992=100 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics 
 
 Figure 2 depicts the price index for food commodities along with an index 
for the average of all commodities and an index for crude oil. Although the food 
commodity index has risen more than 60 percent in the last 2 years, the index 
for all commodities has also risen 60 percent and the index for crude oil has 
risen even more (see, also Trostle 2008)1. Since 1999 food commodity prices 
have risen 98 percent (as of March 2008); the index for all commodities has 
risen 286 percent; and the index for crude oil has risen 547 percent. In this 
perspective, the recent rise in food commodity prices is moderate. Figure 3 
shows that spot prices in early 2008 for soybean and wheat are declining again 
while the spot prices for rice and crude oil continue to rise. The prices of wheat 
and soybeans declined by almost 30% and almost 20%, respectively, since their 
peak at the end of February this year. 
                                                 
1 Ronald Trostle (2008) Global Agricultural Supply and Demand: Factors Contributing to the Recent 
Increase in Food Commodity Prices. ERS/USDA. WRS90801 May 2008. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Oil All Commodities Food Commodities
 6 
 
Figure 3 Daily Price Notations for Crude Oil, Wheat, Maize and 
Soybeans; Spot prices, 200542008, at current USD 
 
Source: World Bank data base (2008) from January, 1 2005 to May, 15 2008.  
 
 However, although real food prices are not extremely high in a historical 
perspective and other commodities have risen more, an increase in the price of 
food – a basic necessity – causes hardships for many lower income consumers 
around the world. This makes food9price inflation socially and politically 
sensitive. This is why much of the world’s attention is now focused on the 
increase in food prices more than on the more rapid increase in prices of other 
commodities, (see, Trostle 2008, p. 4). 
 The question on the minds of many consumers around the world is, “Will 
food prices drop again this time?” Or, stated another way, “Is the current price 
spike any different from those of the past, and if so, why?” 
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2 Long run effects 
 
Long run drivers of demand (based on Scenar 2020, Nowicki et al., 2006)1 
Population and macro9economic growth are important drivers of demand for 
agricultural products. In past years, rapid population growth has accounted for 
the bulk of the increase in food demand for agricultural products, with a smaller 
effect from income changes and other factors (Nowicki et al., 2006)2. The 
world’s population growth will fall to about 1% in the coming ten years. 
Continued economic growth is expected over the coming period in almost all 
regions of the world (see Figure 4).  
 
Expected population developments in period 200592020 
• The world’s population growth will fall from 1.4% in the 199092003 period to 
about 1% in the coming ten years. This is mainly due to birth or fertility 
rates, which are declining and are expected to continue to do so.  
• Almost all annual population growth will occur in low and middle income 
countries, whose population growth rates are much higher than those in high 
income countries. 
• Europe’s share in world population has declined sharply and is projected to 
continue declining during the 21st century. 
• Population growth in Europe is very low (0.3% yearly for EU915) or slightly 
negative (90.2% for EU910). 
• The uncertainty with regard to birth and death rates at world or regional 
level is not too large. However, migration flows between countries and 
regions are much more uncertain.  
 
                                                 
1 Nowicki, P., H. van Meijl, A. Knierim, M. Banse, J. Helming, O. Margraf, B. Matzdorf. 
R. Mnatsakanian, M. Reutter, I. Terluin, K. Overmars, D. Verhoog, C. Weeger, H. Westhoek (2006). 
Scenar 2020 9 Scenario study on agriculture and the rural world. Contract No. 30 9 CE 9 0040087/009
08. European Commission, Directorate9General Agriculture and Rural Development, Brussels. 
2 Projections for population and GDP for the EU member states are taken from a study of the 
Economic Policy Committee of the European Commission called “The 2005 EPC projection of age9
related expenditure: agreed underlying assumptions and projections methodologies, 2005”. The 
projections for the rest of the world are based on assumptions used in the OECD and USDA 
agricultural Outlooks. 
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Figure 4 World population and GDP growth (annual growth %) 
 
Source: USDA for 197091990 and 199092005. Projections for 200592020 derived from Scenar 2020, Nowicki et 
al. (2006). 
 
Global Income growth 
 
• Robust economic growth is expected over the coming period in almost all 
regions of the world in the baseline scenario (see Figure 4).  
• Economic growth will be considerably higher for most of the transitional and 
developing countries than for the EU915, the United States and Japan, in 
particular for Brazil, China, India and the new EU member states. Incomes in 
Europe are expected to increase slightly over the coming years. 
• Annual income growth in Europe is about 2% for EU915 and 3.8% for EU910. 
• World and EU economic growth in the future stays uncertain and depends on 
the amount of investments in education and research, on technological 
opportunities, on the degree of participation in the political, societal and 
market arenas, and on the liberalisation of world commodity and factor 
markets. 
 
 The robust growth of income per capita leads to more “luxury” consumption 
in developed countries. This implies more convenience food, processed 
products (ready to eat) and food safety, environmental and health concerns. In 
developed countries the total amount of food consumed will only grow in a 
limited manner. However, in developing countries a higher income induces more 
production and a shift to more value9added products. Important is the switch 
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from cereals to meat consumption, as an increased demand for meat induces a 
relatively higher demand for grain and protein feed. To produce 1 kg of chicken, 
pork and beef, respectively 2.5 kg, 6.5 kg and 7 kg of feed are required.1 
 
Long9term drivers of supply 
 
With regard to crop production, yield and area developments are important 
drivers of supply. Figure 5 shows that production growth was almost totally 
determined by yield increase while the total area harvested was more or less 
constant. The growth in yields declined from 2% per year in the 197091990 
period to 1.1% in the 199092007 period. USDA expects the growth to decline to 
0.8% per year for the period 200992017 (USDA, 2008). At the global scale, 
crop production area increased in the 197092007 period by 0.15% per year, 
and USDA expects the area to grow by 0.4% per year in the period 200792017. 
 
Figure 5 Development of world grain and oilseed production 
 
                                                 
1 The numbers describe upper9bound estimates of conversion rates: 7 kg of corn to produce 1 kg of 
beef, 6.5 kg of corn to produce 1 kg of pork, and 2.6 kg of corn to produce 1 kg of chicken. Source: 
Ephraim Leibtag, “Corn Prices Near Record High, But What About Food Costs?” In Amber Waves, 
February 2008. Modern technology, however, require much less feed especially in pork production; 
here average feed conversion rates are between 3.292.6 kg of feed per kg of meat. 
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 Figure 6 shows that growth rates of yields for major cereals in developing 
countries are slowing. It should be mentioned that the decline in annual growth 
rates is not necessarily related to a decline in absolute yield growth per annum. 
An important explanation for the decreasing yield growth rates might be the 
declining public agricultural research and development spending over time in 
both developing and developed countries (see Figure 7). Although private sector 
research has grown, private sector R&D is mostly cost reducing\short run 
oriented instead of public R&D, which is often more yield enhancing\long term 
oriented. 
 
Figure 6 Development annual yields for selected cereals in 
developing countries 
 
Source: World Development Report 2008. 
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Figure 7 Public Agricultural R&D Spending Trends, 197642000 
 
Source: Pardey et al. (2006). 
 
• The direct link between R&D spending and yield growth had been intensively 
discussed amongst agricultural scientists and is not fully clear.  
• The general outcome of this discussion is that an additional growth in yield 
rates requires more than additional spending in capital stock but also 
investment in human capital stock and improvements in market institutions 
 
 
3 What explains the recent increase in agricultural prices? 
 
A combination of record low global inventory levels, weather induced supply 
side shocks, surging outside investor influence, record oil prices and structural 
changes in demand for grains and oilseeds due to biofuels have created the 
high prices. The question is whether it is a coincidence that the past and current 
high price levels coincide with high oil prices or whether other reasons for the 
current price peak are more important. 
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Effects on the supply side 
 
• Poor harvests in Australia, Ukraine and Europe for wheat and barley. 
According to FAO statistics, these three regions contributed on average 
51% of total world barley production and 27% of total world wheat 
production for the period 200592006. 
 
Figure 8 Deviation from trend in yields (wheat and coarse grains) in 
tons/ha 
 
Source: OECD and FAO Secretariats. 
 
• Lower harvests in wheat and barley are more than compensated by a 
bumper harvest for corn worldwide.  
o Therefore, world cereal production increased in total even in 2007. 
o The bumper harvest in corn kept corn prices low and the wheat9corn 
spread increased significantly (see Figure 3). 
o Only recently have corn prices also strongly increased. 
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• Higher energy prices lead to higher food prices as costs (e.g. fertilizer, 
processing, and transport) increase. Higher transport costs induce higher 
price effects as distances increase. 
• CAP policies such as mandatory set9aside regulation or production quota 
restrained supply. Furthermore, there was a change from price to income 
support and compensatory payments became decoupled, set aside was 
introduced and export subsidies were diminished. Some of these measures 
limited supply within the EU. However, the general aim of the last CAP 
reforms was an enforcement of farmers’ ability to react to market signals 
instead of following policy signals given by market price support. Measures 
aimed to restrict supply, e.g. production quota or set9aside requirements, 
are instruments designed for a world with declining prices, but which may 
act to reinforce prices in case of food shortages. 
• Low prices in the last decades did not provide an incentive to invest in 
productivity enhancing technologies. 
 
Effects on the demand side 
 
• Constant demand in Europe and Northern America with an increase in 
demand in Asian countries  
• Change in diet in emerging economies. 
• Additional demand for biofuels:  
o 5% of global oilseed production is processed to biodiesel or is used 
directly for transportation.  
o 4.5% of global cereal production is used for ethanol production.  
o Therefore, this marginal extra demand triggered the markets. 
o However, biofuels are not new. Ethanol based on sugar cane exists in 
an economically profitable way in Brazil for a long time.  
o Increasing food and feedstock prices make biofuels less profitable and 
food more profitable. This shifts production back to food (in US is this 
already visible; Trostle 2008, p.17). With current high prices for 
soybeans in the US margins for biodiesel became already negative and 
the biodiesel production slowed down [see presentation of Gerald A. 
Bange (USDA) on the Agricultural Markets Roundtable held April 22, 
2008 Washington, DC at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission]. 
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Development of Stocks 
 
• The trend of a declining stock to use ratio as described in Figure 9 has 
increased and stocks for wheat are currently running on empty. 
o This implies that all the shocks mentioned above could not be mitigated 
by using stocks but lead immediately to price increases. Furthermore, 
it enabled speculation (with stocks available there would have been less 
room for speculation) 
 
Figure 9 Development of stock to use ratio, 196042007 
 
Source: OECD and FAO Secretariats. 
 
Policy Responses to Rising Food Prices 
 
• The rapidly increasing world prices for food grains, feed grains, oilseeds, 
and vegetable oils are causing domestic food prices at the consumer level 
to rise in many countries. In response to rising food prices, some countries 
are beginning to take protective policy measures designed to reduce the 
impact of rising world food commodity prices on their own consumers. 
However, such measures typically force greater adjustments and higher 
prices onto global markets. 
• In the fall of 2007, some exporting countries made policy changes designed 
to discourage exports so as to keep domestic production within the country. 
 15 
The objective was to increase domestic food supplies and restrain increases 
in food prices. The box below depicts a partial list of these policy changes. 
 
Eliminated export subsidies: 
• China eliminated rebates on value9added taxes on exported grains and grain products. 
The rebate was effectively an export subsidy that was eliminated. 
 
Export taxes: 
• China, with food prices still rising after eliminating the value9added tax rebate, imposed 
an export tax on a similar list of grains and products. 
• Argentina raised export taxes on wheat, corn, soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean 
oil. 
• Russia and Kazakhstan raised export taxes on wheat. 
• Malaysia imposed export taxes on palm oil. 
 
Export quantitative restrictions: 
• Argentina restricted the volume of wheat that could be exported even before raising 
export taxes on grains. 
• Ukraine established quantitative restrictions on wheat exports. 
• India and Vietnam put quantitative restrictions on rice exports. 
 
Export bans: 
• Ukraine, Serbia, and India banned wheat exports. 
• Egypt, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia banned rice exports. India, the world’s third 
largest rice exporter, banned exports of rice other than basmati, significantly reducing 
global exportable supplies.  
• Kazakhstan banned exports of oilseeds and vegetable oils. Early in 2008, importing 
countries also began to take protective policy measures to combat rising food prices. 
Their objective was to make high9cost imports available to consumers at lower prices. A 
partial list of policy changes follows. 
 
The following countries reduced import tariffs: 
• India (wheat flour) 
• Indonesia (soybeans and wheat; streamlined the process for importing wheat flour) 
• Serbia (wheat) 
• Thailand (pork) 
• EU (grains) 
• Korea and Mongolia (various food commodities) 
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Subsidizing consumers: 
• Some countries, including Morocco and Venezuela, buy food commodities at high world 
prices and subsidize their distribution to consumers. 
Other decisions by importers: 
• Iran imported corn from the United States, something that has occurred rarely—only 
when they could not procure corn elsewhere at reasonable prices. 
 
 The policies adopted by importing countries also changed price relationships in world 
markets. Their policy changes increased the global demand for food commodities even when 
world prices were already rapidly escalating. 
Source: Ronald Trostle (2008) Global Agricultural Supply and Demand: Factors Contributing to the Recent Increase 
in Food Commodity Prices. ERS/USDA. WRS90801 May 2008. 
 
 Other effects 
 
• USD exchange rate developments. World prices are denominated in dollars 
and the dollar depreciated against most currencies. The increase in prices in 
other currencies is therefore much less. 
• SPECULATION: 
• In recent months spot and future prices do not fully converge. 
• Future prices remain higher than prices on spot markets. 
o Reason for this development: 
 Most hedging (90%) is Index9hedging, i.e. ‘traditional’ short9 and 
long hedging does not dominate the price development in the 
future markets. 
 Thus, if everybody expects high prices, then future prices tend to 
be higher than the spot prices. 
o So, part of current high prices can be attributed to this ‘bubble’. 
• Difficult to estimate the impact of speculation in this story.  
o The crises on the financial markets are diverting funds away from 
traditional financial institutions leading to a large pool of funds available 
for investments in other markets.  
o There is definitely a impact of speculation in current high prices  
o Hard to say it makes X %.  
o Growing volatility in food markets due to the fact that most of hedging 
is based on index funds and not anymore on the 'traditional' short and 
long hedging. This share is less than 10% in total market volume.  
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o An example for the current volatility: In the 1st week of March the 
fluctuation of corn prices was more than 150 USD/t, which is more 
than last year’s average corn price! 
• Impact of speculation on current spike in agricultural prices is difficult to 
quantify. Figure 10 shows the composition of the corn futures markets 
broken down between commercial merchants, managed money funds and 
commodity index traders together with the price development in USD per 
bushel of corn (in red on the right9hand scale).  
o It clearly shows that not only the ‘speculative’ index and fund hedging 
but also the increase in short futures by commercial merchants 
contributed to the dramatic increase in corn future prices. 
o However, the managed money funds which are mostly pension funds – 
which diversify their portfolio now also to agricultural commodities – cut 
down their purchase of additional contracts on long position when 
prices increased dramatically (see the development of the green line in 
following figure). 
o A formal assessment is hampered by data and methodological 
problems, including the difficulty of identifying speculative and hedging9
related trades. 
o A number of recent studies seem to suggest that speculation has not 
systematically contributed to higher commodity prices or increased 
price volatility.  
 For example, a recent IMF staff analysis (September 2006 World 
Economic Outlook) shows that speculative activity tends to 
respond to price movements (rather than the other way around), 
suggesting that the causality runs from prices to changes in 
speculative positions.  
 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has argued that 
speculation may have reduced price volatility by increasing market 
liquidity, which allowed market participants to adjust their 
portfolios, thereby encouraging entry by new participants. 
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Figure 10 CBOT Corn Market Composition January 2007 4 April 
2008 
 
Source: Derived from a presentation of Dave Kass at the Agricultural Markets Roundtable held April 22, 2008 
Washington, DC at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
 
 
4 First quantitative results of the analysis of key driving factors 
 
• OECD Outlook 200792017: The OECD performed some scenarios to see the 
impact of various drivers on their Outlook projection (OECD 2008). This 
analysis highlights the outcome of a situation where biofuel policies are in 
place under the reference scenario and different assumptions are moderate, 
e.g. income growth, development of crude oil prices, etc.: 
o If biofuel production stays at its 2007 level, then world wheat prices 
would be 5% lower, maize 13% lower and vegetable oil 15% lower 
compared to the reference scenario where biofuel production in 2017 
more than doubles relative to the 2007 level. 
 19 
o A constant crude oil price implies 10% lower prices for all three 
commodities, due to the fact that the assumed high crude oil price 
under the reference scenario will make biofuel crops more profitable. 
o Lower income growth is especially relevant for vegetable oils (more 
than 10%). 
o Higher growth rates in yields for important biofuel crops will lower the 
world market prices for their production by more than 5 % for wheat 
and maize. 
 
Figure 11 Sensitivity on analysis of world price changes 
 
Source: OECD, unpublished. 
 
 These results are inline with our own results on the impact of biofuel 
policies, which are presented in Figure 14 below. 
• International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) study  
o The percentage contribution of biofuels demand to price increases 
from 2000907 is the difference between 2007 prices in the two 
scenarios, divided by the increase in prices in the baseline from 20009
2007. 
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o The increased biofuel demand between 2000 and 2007, compared 
with previous historical rates of growth, is estimated to have accounted 
for 30 percent of the increase in weighted average cereal prices during 
2000907.  
 Maize – 39% 
 Rice – 21% 
 Wheat – 22% 
o Rapid growth in biofuel demand has contributed to the rapid rise in 
cereal prices, but it has not been a dominant driving force in the 20009
07 period, except perhaps in the case of maize.  
o The fundamentals of supply and demand seem to be playing more of a 
role in the rapid increase in prices during this period, especially for 
commodities like rice and wheat.  
o After 2007 prices increases – for rice in particular – seem to be driven 
by the relatively ‘thin’ nature of the rice market with a limited amount of 
international trade compared to total production. 
 
Figure 12 Biofuels: Impact on world cereal prices since 2000 
 
Source: Impact Simulations 2008. IFPRI. 
 
 21 
o Unilateral trade policy actions of individual Asian countries, which have 
sought to put into place export bans and import subsidies for rice.  
o Speculative trading and storage behaviour; private operators taking 
advantage of opportunities. 
• Agri9Canada quantified the impact of all the policy responses. The impact of 
policies added a few percent for almost all commodities, except for rice 
where the impact is substantial (16%). 
 
Figure 13 Impact of export restriction policies on world prices 
 
Source: Agriculture and Agri9Food Canada, unpublished. 
 
 Experts are pointing out that it is hard to quantify the separate impacts. The 
contribution of biofuel demand to the increase in average cereal prices of 
30% presented by IFPRI was criticized by some colleagues. Some find it too 
high, other too low. However, all studies point out that a combination of 
factors was responsible for the rise. The analyses of OECD, FAPRI and also 
of Banse et al. (2008) indicated that the impact on world price levels is 
commodity specific. For corn the impact is relatively high due to the fact 
that most US ethanol production is corn9based. For other cereals – e.g., 
wheat and rice, where the use for biofuels is almost zero – only indirect 
effects over the land use affects the world price level. For those 
commodities an estimated increase of 30% – as indicated in the IFPRI 
estimates – seems to be rather high. 
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5 The future 
 
- High prices are their own worst enemy. Increased profit margins entice 
entrepreneurial investment, which results in increased production. Lower 
market prices inevitably follow. The ‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith ensures 
that winners’ gains and losers’ losses will be temporary, as entrepreneurs 
correct market imbalances. In the USA, in the 2008 spring planting farmers 
are shifting from maize to wheat and soybeans, setting the prices of the 
latter on a downward trajectory and stabilising the price of the former. 
- Higher prices induce more production as planted areas increase and 
available arable land will be used more intensively. Therefore, the current 
situation is not structural and as a result prices will go down again. However, 
first stocks have to be built up again. Both effects take some time. In Brazil 
and Russia there are ample opportunities as additional land can be taken 
into production, whereas in many other countries production can only be 
higher due to intensification. According to USDA analyses, Russia, Ukraine 
and Argentina can become one of the world’s top grain exporters. 
- R&D investments in agriculture (e.g. yields, etc) become more profitable with 
higher food prices. 
- Strategic stocks are essential to limit price volatility in world agricultural 
markets, but they are costly. 
- The expected impact on world prices of the 10% EU9biofuel directive and the 
various global biofuel initiatives is depicted in the graph below (Banse et al, 
2008). If all initiatives are implemented together and technological change 
stays on the historic trend, then the impact on world prices is substantial. 
The arrival and impact of second9generation biofuels is uncertain. According 
to Banse et al. (2008), biofuels lead to higher agricultural income, land use 
and land prices, and a loss of biodiversity. 
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Figure 14 Change in real world prices, in percent, 2020 relative to 
2001 
 
Source: Banse, M., H. van Meijl, A. Tabeau and G. Woltjer (2008), Will EU Biofuel Policies affect Global Agricultural 
Markets?, European Review of Agricultural Economics (forthcoming). 
 
- Development of oil prices is crucial for the development of biofuels. Some 
experts point that prices stay high due to increased demand in Asia and 
depleting supply resources. Others indicate that this is a temporary situation 
as capacity is lacking at the moment due to too few investments in the past. 
If oil prices stay high, food and energy markets will be more interlinked. The 
oil prices will then put both a floor and a ceiling1 for prices in the food 
markets (Schmidhuber, 2007). As energy markets are more elastic, the 
long9term trend of food prices might be changed (less negative to positive 
dependent on development oil price). 
- High feedstock prices make biofuels less profitable (ceiling effect), as does 
a low oil price (floor effect). Even at current level of crude oil prices of 120 
USD per barrel almost no biofuels are economically viable without policies. A 
low oil price implies that only biofuels will be produced under mandates or 
                                                 
1 Ceiling price effect: as feedstock costs are the most important cost element of all (large scale) 
forms of bioenergy use, feed stock prices (food and agricultural prices) cannot rise faster than 
energy prices in order for agriculture to remain competitive in energy markets. Floor price effect: If 
demand is particular pronounced as in the case of cane9based ethanol, bioenergy demand has 
created a quasi intervention system and an effective floor price for sugar in this case. 
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that they are heavily subsidized. Without an increase in oil prices the impact 
of biofuels is therefore limited to the impact of filling the mandates. 
- The interrelation with the energy markets may slowdown or reverse 
Cochrane’s treadmill or Owens development squeeze which imply declining 
real agricultural prices, less farmers, larger scale farming and possible 
depopulated areas.  
- Volatility of world prices might be an important problem in the future that 
causes hunger in terms of very high prices for poor consumers and 
problems for poor farmers when prices are low. The ceiling and especially 
the floor may act as an intervention price in case of very volatile prices. A 
floor may also stimulate agriculture in the (poor) world. Hunger is not a 
problem directly related with biofuels but often of bad policies, and 
improperly functioning factor and commodity markets.1 In principle, there is 
enough food in the world but there is a distribution problem. 
- Rising food commodity prices tend to negatively affect lower income 
consumers more than higher income consumers. First, lower income 
consumers spend a larger share of their income on food. Second, staple 
food commodities such as corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans account for a 
larger share of food expenditures in low9income families. Third, consumers 
in low9income, food9deficit countries are vulnerable because they must rely 
on imported supplies, usually purchased at higher world prices. Fourth, 
countries receiving food aid donations based on fixed budgets receive 
smaller quantities of food aid. A simplified comparison of the impact of 
higher food commodity prices on consumers in high9income countries and 
on consumers in low9income, food9deficit countries illustrates these 
differences (see Table 1). 
                                                 
1 AG assessment (2008), “Policy options for improving livelihoods include access to microcredit and 
other financial services; legal frameworks that ensure access and tenure to resources and land; 
recourse to fair conflict resolution; and progressive evolution and proactive engagement in Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) regimes and related instruments.” 
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o This illustrative comparison shows that for a consumer in a high9income 
country a 309percent increase in food prices causes food expenditures 
to rise 3 percent (€1200), while for a consumer in a low9income 
country food expenditures increase by 15 percentage points. 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
The motivation at the origin of this memo can be summarised in four questions: 
- Is the current price increase driven by real or monetary issues (notably a 
speculation phenomenon)?  
- Are natural resource and basic food commodity prices linked together?  
- Is the shortfall in production also linked to governance issues that limit 
investment and production? 
- To what extent is the underused capacity in land and man9power a result of 
lack of investment capacity, both at the micro level (tools and seed) and at 
the macro level (storage and transportation infrastructure)?   
 
 The work on these questions allows the formulation of responses, and also 
some broader observations.  
Table 1 Impact of Higher Food Commodity Prices on Consumers’ 
Food Budgets 
 High income 
countries 
Low income, 
food deficit 
countries 
Initial Situation  
Income € 40,000  € 1,000  
Food Expenditure € 4,000  € 500  
Food Costs as % of Income 10% 50% 
   
30% increase in food prices  
new costs for total food 
expenditure 
€ 5,200  € 650  
Food Costs as % of Income 13% 65% 
Source: Own compilation. 
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 From our work it is clear that the price increases have several roots and that 
a normally functioning market will in time provide a certain degree of corrective 
action. But policy/political decisions can prevent the market from doing so. In 
any case, the time lapse for the market to act does not remove the acuity of the 
price distortion that affects the poorest people, and urgent intervention is 
necessary to alleviate the effects of short9term price peaks. 
 Natural resource prices lead basic food commodity prices; the rate of 
growth of the former has historically been (and is again at present) higher than 
the latter. Biofuels create a more direct link between food and fuel prices, if fuel 
prices are high: the long9term trend of declining real food prices might be 
dampened or reversed. 
 The influence of policy/political decisions mentioned above is certainly 
present when considering why production in many countries is below the 
potential capacity to produce food. Not only has land been voluntarily removed 
from production in some cases, but the access to technology and markets is 
sometimes also limited by factors that are strictly in the realm of governance. 
But then there are also potential producers, who simply can not make it into the 
market, and they can be assisted through micro9credit or through the donation 
of tools, seeds and the development of irrigation, storage capacity and 
transportation facilities to integrate into market structures. 
 Our further observations are of several orders, and theses are with regard 
to policy implications, market failure, social equity, and required policy action. 
 
Policy implications 
 
With regard to the EU, CAP reform was designed to enforce farmers’ reaction to 
market signals. There should be no surprise, therefore, when farmers do, and 
therefore production falls close to the level of world demand. The problem, 
however, is the time lag between the demand in the market and a farmer’s 
decision on what – and how much – to plant. There is always some degree of 
‘inadequate’ response on the supply side. Around the world, farmers are now 
responding to price signals and are increasing their production of cereals. 
Building up and managing stocks is not the primary responsibility of farmers, 
and in a free market this is left to traders; some government intervention might 
be considered, but a return to automatic intervention based solely on 
commodity prices should be absolutely avoided! 
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Will current price level persist? 
 
High prices can only ‘cured’ by high prices. This may initially seem to be a 
provocative statement, but the simple fact is that – as stated above – farmers 
do react to price signals. So do all the other agents in the economy, including 
speculators! The food price ‘crisis’ will certainly be prolonged through protective 
measures by national governments, although the issue of civil stability may 
encourage some governments to take such actions, to reassure their 
populations that ‘something is being done’. Biofuels, however, create a more 
direct link between food and fuel prices and if fuel prices increase further, the 
long9term trend of declining real food prices might be dampened or reversed. 
 
Who is mostly affected? 
 
The consumers of food in low9income countries with food and energy deficits 
are those who will suffer most in any sudden or rapid price shift for basic 
commodities, of which foremost is food. In principle, current high prices provide 
additional income opportunities for farmers. Whether farmers in developing 
countries will benefit from current high prices on world food markets remains 
questionable and depends on the degree of integration of regional in global food 
markets. But if there is no structural market failure involved per se, as stated 
above, then this means that the conditions of productivity and market access 
are the priorities that have not been addressed successfully for a long period of 
time before a price crisis occurs.  
 
Required policy action 
 
Short9term action is to urgently increase spending on food aid (which has gone 
down during the last years). Long9term production capacity improvement 
(including publically financed agricultural research) is essential to avoid repeated 
price crises. The current crisis is not a crisis in terms of shortage of food, but a 
crisis in terms of income shortage (in terms of purchasing power and of 
investment potential to increase productive capacity). Policy measures should 
enable especially the poor to be able to participate in the economy, and 
therefore for the poor countries to generate income within a world market.  
 
